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There are important lessons to be learnt from the recent ‘Swine Flu’ pandemic. Before we call it a pandemic,
we need to have appropriate trigger points that involve not only the spread of the virus but also its level of
virulence. This was not done for H1N1 (swine flu). We need to ensure that we improve the techniques used in
trying to decrease the spread of infection*both in the community and within our hospitals. This means
improved infection control and hygiene, and the use of masks, alcohol hand rubs and so on. We also need to
have a different approach to vaccines. Effective vaccines were produced only after the epidemic had passed
and therefore had relatively little impact in preventing many infections. Mass population strategies involving
vaccines and antivirals also misused large amounts of scarce medical resources.
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W
hen a new H1N1 strain of influenza was
reported in Mexico in April 2009, it appeared
to be associated with a high mortality. Media
reports helped fuel fears around the world that we might
see a recurrence of events associated with the ‘Spanish
flu’ in 19181919, when tens of millions of people died.
This triggered internationally, pandemic plans*designed
to cope with predicted new virulent strains of influenza,
such as ‘Bird Flu’ (H5N1). Governments and their
populations asked what would be the effects on them-
selves and others. Access to antiviral drugs and vaccines
and the measures that were needed to prevent the spread
of this virus were at the forefront of this discussion.
The virus did indeed spread quickly around the world.
However, by May 2009, data from the USA and else-
where showed that its virulence was considerably less
than that initially reported in Mexico (1). The case
fatality rate was likely less than 1 in 10,000 people
infected (2). However, there remained concerns that
enhanced virulence might still be seen during the
upcoming winter in the Southern Hemisphere.
Winter arrived and large numbers of cases were
reported in southern Australia in June 2009 (1, 3, 4).
However, the mortality rate was very low and similar to
what had been seen in the USA and Canada during their
spring. Data from many countries also showed that the
elderly seemed to be relatively protected from getting
infected (presumably as a result of previous infections
with other influenza viruses and thus acquired immu-
nity). However, certain other groups were more vulner-
able (16). In general, these were the same groups that
were usually more vulnerable during seasonal influenza*
those with underlying heart disease, lung disease, and
so on. The unexpected, much higher risk group was
pregnancy. Women who were pregnant had a hospitalisa-
tion and death rate 310 times higher compared to other
females in the same age group (3, 5, 6). While children
and young adults had very high rates of infection, their
overall risk of death was low. On a population basis, for
those under the age of 30 without risk factors, the chance
of dying during the winter epidemic in Australia was less
than 1 per million people, even though a large proportion
of children worldwide were infected (likely about 50% of
children) (6, 7).
The virus was also likely spreading widely and much
earlier than initially thought. In Victoria, the spread was
likely weeks prior to it being first detected*probably at
the same time that the virus was first detected in the USA
(8). This was likely to be the case in Mexico as well (with
the spread possibly 6 months prior to its initial laboratory
diagnosis) (8).
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With all the major new ‘pandemic’ strains of influenza
(Asian flu, Hong Kong flu, as well as swine flu) there
were delays before it was recognised that we were dealing
with new virus strains. This ‘late diagnosis’ means
attempts at containment will always be very difficult or
likely impossible. Widespread circulation of the virus
occurs for many months before there is recognition that
the strain is new. The vast majority of people with a ‘new’
infection have only very mild disease and thus goes
unnoticed until larger than expected numbers of people
are admitted to hospital*usually with complications
such as bacterial pneumonia. Only then it is recognised
that something unusual has happened. It then also takes
time before viral isolates are obtained by reference
laboratories. Then, sequencing and viral typing finally
lead to a realisation that something is ‘new’. This makes
not only any containment policy very difficult but also
means vaccines based on current egg-based technology
will never be available in a timely fashion.
Even when attempts were made to contain the virus in
areas where it was not circulating, this did not appear to
be successful for ‘swine flu’ anywhere around the world.
In Australia, when it became obvious that attempts at
containment were unsuccessful, a newly defined ‘Protect
phase’ was developed, which was added to the previous
influenza management plans (9). This then appropriately
focused our health resources on those who were known
to be at a higher risk and thus more vulnerable
to complications rather than the entire population. In
practice, similar approaches were taken around the world.
Australia was one of the first countries to have a
vaccine available for use in the general population. It
became available, however, only in early October 2009*
months after the epidemic had peaked (Fig. 1) (4). Our
current vaccine technology does not have the ability to
produce enough vaccine in a timely fashion to protect
large proportions of the population when a new form of
influenza develops and spreads. We need to develop new
influenza vaccines that are safe and effective and that give
protection for many years and against multiple strains*
including newly emerging ones.
One essential issue, on which we need international
consensus, is the trigger point for defining a pandemic.
Whenever a ‘pandemic’ is called, it will have major effects
on the way governments and health departments allocate
resources. It will also have profound effects in how society
functions, particularly if it includes closing schools,
workplaces, and so on. The WHO definition of pandemic
needs to re-incorporate a component that takes into
account severity (2, 10) as, appropriately, does one plan
from the USA (11). If we define a pandemic (as was the
case for ‘swine flu’) as merely being the spread of a new
influenza virus strain around the world, we will be calling
pandemics every few years. Many previous seasonal
influenza strains using the current WHO definition could
also have been defined as ‘pandemic strains’. Unless
the severity of the infection is much worse than what we
see with seasonal influenza, it is inappropriate to invoke
pandemic plans internationally.
‘Swine flu’ caused major problems for hospitals around
the world and their intensive care units. However, one of
the major reasons for this difficulty was our chronic lack
of spare capacity in hospitals. Overcrowding, bed block,
and ambulance bypass occur every winter in Australia
and in many other countries (2). In Australia, about 4,900
people with swine flu were admitted to hospital (4). It was
mainly short stays of 2 or 3 days or less. Australia,
however, has more than 8 million hospital admissions per
year (12). It is a concern that an increase in hospital
activity of less than 0.1% of yearly admissions and bed
Fig. 1. Laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Australia, up to 6 November 2009 by jurisdiction. Source: Australian
influenza surveillance summary report No. 26, 2009, reporting period: 31 October 20096 November 2009 (see Ref. 4).
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days managed to severely strain so many health systems
around the world. If these systems had more winter
capacity (i.e. available staffed beds) particularly in their
ICUs, then a lot of strain in our health systems would
have been avoided. It also shows that if we ever have a
much more virulent virus spreading than swine flu (e.g.
involving 25% of the population but with a mortality of
10% instead of the B0.01%), then our hospital systems
would not be able to cope with this 1,000-fold higher viral
virulence factor and the increased demands on the health
system. We will need to find other ways to enable people
to care for themselves and their families other than
relying on our hospitals.
For many people admitted to ICU, there were con-
siderable delays in both diagnosing their infection and
receiving appropriate therapy. The value of drugs such as
oseltamivir is still controversial (13). However, if anyone
infected is likely to obtain major benefits from its use, it is
those with underlying risk factors. However, there were
often delays*in pregnant women a median of 9 days
(5)*before those with recognised risk factors received
therapy after the onset of their symptoms.
The widespread media coverage as well as government
press releases induced panic and undue fear in the
population. This resulted in Emergency Departments
and doctor surgeries being overwhelmed with requests,
initially for antivirals and then for vaccination. The effect
of this was those who were much more likely to be at risk
for this infection were often not able to access drugs. The
vast majority of people who do not have risk factors just
needed to stay at home and get better by themselves
(usually within 2 or 3 days) and seek medical help only if
they developed symptoms to suggest that they developed
a secondary complication such as bacterial pneumonia.
Given the inevitable delays in producing influenza
vaccines, we need to re-examine how effective mass
vaccination is ever likely to be (14), as well as its cost
benefits. In the UK, ‘swine flu’ vaccines had very poor
cost benefits (15). This was mainly because the vaccine
was only available after the epidemic had peaked. The
other problem with mass population vaccination pro-
grammes was that the majority of those with risk factors
were the elderly, and they were already immune (and was
evident early during the epidemic, as they were not
getting infected). Vaccine and other studies also sug-
gested that at least a third of those between the ages of 18
and 65 years had protective levels of antibodies and that
70% had detectable antibodies (7, 1416). It was only in
children where there was a large proportion of individuals
who were not already immune prior to the 2009 winter.
However, given the widespread infection rate in children
(with most asymptomatic), a large proportion of children
are now also immune (3, 7, 14). Thus, rolling out a
vaccine campaign to a population after the epidemic has
peaked and where the majority are already immune is
unlikely to ever have a very favourable costbenefit ratio.
One viewpoint suggested in the UK, where more than
£1billion was spent on vaccines, was that it was likely that
the vaccines prevented only 26 deaths in the 2009/2010
winter (17). There may have been some added small
benefits for the subsequent 2010/2011 winter, but if a
large proportion of population were already immune by
early 2010 (7, 14) it is hard to see how the vaccination
programme had a very favourable cost benefit.
By October 2010 and at the start of most seasonal flu
vaccination campaigns, in the northern hemisphere and
elsewhere, there had been no predicted catastrophic
‘second wave’ with swine flu. The subsequent winter
(2010/2011) also followed the same pattern as what had
occurred in the Southern Hemisphere (18). While H1N1
was the prominent virus that spread, because of wide-
spread immunity (mainly from previous infections), the
number of people infected and admitted to hospital was
considerably less than in the previous winter. Following
initial widespread infections, high levels of subsequent
immunity seem to be what occurred also after previous
‘pandemics’ in the past 120 years (7).
We need systems in place that can show us on an
ongoing manner that we are not seeing unusual side-effect
profiles from vaccines that have changed their composi-
tion from the previous season. Passive surveillance is
usually the only way that influenza vaccines are mon-
itored for safety in a population after their release and
a change in formulation. Passive surveillance, however,
frequently greatly underreports the number of adverse
events that may have occurred (19). A lack of active
surveillance resulted in slow recognition of the problem
with the swine flu vaccine in the USA in the 1970s, when a
much higher risk of Guillain Barre´ syndrome occurred
(20). This was also the case in Australia with febrile
seizures. Even though 9 in 1,000 young children devel-
oped febrile seizures after receiving a CSL Biotherapies
trivalent seasonal vaccine containing a swine flu
antigen, there was a delay in recognising the problem
and actions to stop further vaccinations (2123). We
need active prospective surveillance done through general
practices and/or vaccine clinics to detect any untoward
side effects occurring in, say, the first 3,0004,000 adults
and children vaccinated with any vaccine, where the
composition has been changed from what was used
previously.
Before we roll out any vaccine to the entire population,
we need to ensure that it is both effective and safe and not
just rely on surrogate markers. Antibody levels often
correlate poorly with immunity and protection (7). We
need good active surveillance systems in place to detect
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side effects and/or poor efficacy, particularly because we
can detect those side effects that are unexpected (2125).
We also need better and timelier data on vaccine
efficacy. The Canadians have done a commendable job
in setting up such surveillance and this has also been
done in Victoria (24, 25). The Canadian data, however,
unexpectedly showed that for those vaccinated in 2008
with their seasonal influenza vaccine, there was a twofold
increased risk of becoming infected with swine flu
compared to those not vaccinated.
Another important issue to consider is ‘original anti-
genic sin’ (26). This means that if the first exposure to a
virus is through a vaccine strain, an individual may have
less long-term and cross-protection against new strains
of influenza than if they acquired immunity via a natural
infection. This raises questions as to whether the routine
immunisation of children with seasonal influenza vac-
cines might increase their subsequent risk if a new
pandemic strain spreads.
We need to learn lessons from the past. In 1918/1919,
the majority of deaths in that pandemic were from
secondary bacterial infections*usually pneumonia (2,
27). Even in more recent times, bacterial infections play a
major part. In the USA, a large proportion of those after
influenza infections have bacteria isolated from sterile
sites (28). When one considers that it is relatively
uncommon in pneumonia to culture bacteria from sterile
sites such as blood, this implies that bacteria are still
playing a major part in the majority of deaths following
influenza infections*just as they were in the past (2, 27).
The reason this is important is that by mainly focusing
just on the virus through antivirals and influenza
vaccines, we may be not targeting the best interventions
that will prevent deaths. More effective may be identify-
ing that small number of people who develop more
serious bacterial complications following influenza and
then make sure that not only we give them promptly
antivirals but also antibiotics, as our ability to discrimi-
nate a viral from bacterial infections in those with more
severe lung involvement is relatively poor (29).
This pandemic and other reviews show the importance
of infection control and hygiene. We tend to have an
undue focus on medical interventions such as drugs and
influenza vaccines. Overall, oseltamivir may have caused
more harm than good, as well as being an inappropriate
waste of money for the vast majority of people who took
them, especially otherwise healthy children (2, 13). The
widespread use of oseltamivir had no obvious effect on
the epidemic curve in any country compared to previous
influenza seasons. Its use was however associated with
widespread nausea and vomiting, especially in children in
whom the morbidity and mortality of influenza was very
low. Infection control is relatively inexpensive and likely
more effective in stopping the spread of viruses. A recent
Cochrane review suggests that if masks, alcohol hand
hygiene and other approaches were used, these give good
protection (30). In Hong Kong during the SARS
epidemic, the widespread use of masks and hand hygiene
by the population resulted in marked reduction in all
respiratory illnesses (31). All these suggest that there may
be a lot more diseases transmitted through hands than we
have previously recognised. The value of masks may be
more to stop a person touching one’s own nose and
mouth rather than decreasing the inhalation of any
respiratory aerosols or droplets. This has had some
significance as there was a lot of controversy as to what
type of masks needed to be used, for example, surgical
masks or N95 masks (30). The available evidence suggests
that using masks is protective compared to not using
them. However, there is no great difference in regard to
which type of mask is used.
In summary, there are important lessons for us to learn
from the recent swine flu pandemic. First, before we pull
an international trigger to call a pandemic, we need to
have appropriate trigger points that involve not only the
spread of the virus but also its level of virulence. This was
not done for swine flu in 2009. We need to ensure that we
improve techniques to decrease the spread of infection
both in the community and within our hospitals. This
essentially means improved infection control and hygiene
and the use of masks, alcohol hand rubs, and so on.
We need to have a different approach to vaccines. The
vaccines were produced only after the epidemic had
passed and so have had and will have little efficacy in
preventing many infections. Mass population strategies
also misused large amounts of scarce medical resources.
The large-scale uses of antivirals such as oseltamivir also
appear to have been ineffective and very poor value for
money on a population level.
Overall, our response to swine flu shows that we need
to rethink how we declare and respond to pandemics.
Even though, around the world, huge efforts were
made to try and contain the spread of swine flu virus,
these were unsuccessful. Overall, they appear to have had
little influence on the spread of the virus, despite vast
amounts of resources and effort expended. The virus in
the vast majority of people infected caused only a mild
illness and from which people made a full and rapid
recovery and then developed immunity. Maybe it is time
for a different approach. Australia changed to a newly
defined ‘Protect phase’ when it realised that the pandemic
could not be controlled. Then, they focused on those who
were known to be at high risk and thus more vulnerable
to complications. This may be a better international
Peter Collignon
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approach rather than trying to look at a whole popula-
tion approach using vaccines and antivirals.
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